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IMAGINING CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY AS A 
PUBLIC GOOD RATHER THAN  
A CORPORATE BAD 
Wendy E. Wagner 
INTRODUCTION 
Corporations have been criticized for their environmental 
misdeeds for over a century,1 so it is not surprising that many view 
corporate approaches to sustainability with skepticism.2  Reports of 
green-washing and other forms of misleading advertising by a 
handful of corporations only serve to reinforce this negative 
perception.3  
 
  Joe A. Worsham Centennial Professor, University of Texas School of 
Law.  Many thanks to Gabriel Markoff for his able research assistance and to 
the students and faculty at the Wake Forest Law Review Symposium for their 
helpful comments on an earlier draft.  Contact: WWagner@law.utexas.edu. 
 1. See, e.g., MORTON MINTZ, AT ANY COST: CORPORATE GREED, WOMEN, AND 
THE DALKON SHIELD (1985) (describing A.H. Robins Company’s decisions to 
market dangerous products and to suppress research indicating that the 
products could kill users); PAUL BRODEUR, OUTRAGEOUS MISCONDUCT: THE 
ASBESTOS INDUSTRY ON TRIAL (1985) (describing similar issues in the asbestos 
industry); DEVRA DAVIS, WHEN SMOKE RAN LIKE WATER: TALES OF 
ENVIRONMENTAL DECEPTION AND THE BATTLE AGAINST POLLUTION (2002) 
(describing the same for polluting industries); STANTON A. GLANTZ ET AL., THE 
CIGARETTE PAPERS (1996) (describing the same for the tobacco industry); 
GERALD MARKOWITZ & DAVID ROSNER, DECEIT AND DENIAL: THE DEADLY POLITICS 
OF INDUSTRIAL POLLUTION (2002) (describing the same for lead industry). 
 2. See, e.g., Cynthia A. Williams, Corporate Law and the Internal Point of 
View in Legal Theory: A Tale of Two Trajectories, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1629, 
1631 (2006). Professor Williams reports, for example, how energy traders 
chortle with delight at out-of-control fires in California, which from their 
standpoint mean only greater revenues in energy sales as a result of the 
decreased supply.  Id. at 1658. 
 3. See, e.g., Markus J. Milne et al., Wither Ecology? The Triple Bottom 
Line, the Global Reporting Initiative, and the Institutionalization of Corporate 
Sustainability Reporting 11 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with authors), 
available at http://ebookbrowse.com/wither-ecology-tbl-gri-and-corporate 
-sustainability-reporting-pdf-d81243137 (observing that “while some companies 
have been quick to publicize their high [Global Reporting Initiative] scores . . . , 
in some cases this may have been less about gaining credibility and more about 
deflecting attention from poor social and environmental performance per se”); 
Williams, supra note 2, at 1643 (noting that “[o]f the twenty-seven 
organizations comprising the charter group [that endorsed the Global Reporting 
Initiative], only five were companies . . . [and] four of those five companies have 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2509427 
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Based on this evidence of poor corporate behavior, a number of 
analysts have concluded that sustainability should be regulated in 
the same way as other industrial polluting activities.4  Just as laws 
require corporations to disclose information on their polluting 
activities because these activities are wrongs to society, so the 
thinking goes, corporations should be required to engage in an 
internal accounting of their unsustainable practices.  Specifically, 
corporations should be required to assess the sustainability of their 
operations in standardized disclosures and take their resulting, 
publicly-administered medicine, whether it involves being shamed 
in the marketplace or subjected to greater regulatory control with 
respect to resource use or disposal practices.5 
This Article argues that addressing corporate sustainability by 
putting the onus on corporations to assess the sustainability of their 
operations may get the solution exactly backwards, at least at this 
early stage in advancing sustainability.  Rather than view the lack 
of sustainability efforts as another corporate bad that individual 
corporations should be required to redress,6 this Article advocates 
that corporate sustainability should be treated instead as a public 
good that becomes the government’s responsibility.  Information 
about an industrial sector’s sustainability profile—for example, a 
life cycle analysis of a typical facility—has clear public good 
qualities associated with it.  This type of assessment allows for cross 
comparisons between competitors, identifies areas for possible 
synergies among producing companies, and highlights areas that 
may ultimately deserve further regulatory oversight.7  Equally 
important, if sustainability analyses concerning various production 
processes and services are produced in the first instance by publicly 
funded, third-party experts rather than extracted from private 
actors, the resulting reports are more likely to be reliable, complete, 
and accessible to a wide-range of stakeholders who can use them in 
public-benefitting ways. 
The argument for treating corporate sustainability as a public 
 
pretty clear public relations reasons to want to be associated with a corporate 
accountability initiative [because of concerns about stricter regulation or a 
preexisting reputation for being a bad corporate citizen]”); see generally Jacob 
Vos, Note, Actions Speak Louder than Words: Greenwashing in Corporate 
America, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 673 (2009) (discussing 
greenwashing more generally). 
 4. See, e.g., infra note 77 and accompanying text; see also Regulation 
Eclipses Innovation as Main Driver in Sustainability, BUSINESS GREEN (Apr. 29, 
2010), http://www.businessgreen.com/bg/news/1806699/regulation-eclipses 
-innovation-main-driver-sustainability. 
 5. See infra Part I.A. 
 6. This approach seems, at least superficially, to help circumvent some of 
the barriers to sustainability identified by Professor Sjåfjell. See generally Beate 
Sjåfjell, Regulating Companies as if the World Matters, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2012). 
 7. See infra Part III. 
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good, rather than as a corporate bad, unfolds in four Parts.  Part I 
details the need for much greater information on the sustainability 
of corporate practices.  At present, there appears to be little dispute 
that rigorous sustainability assessments of major corporate 
production processes are a valuable tool for directing change, and 
that life cycle analyses excel in providing this kind of comprehensive 
assessment.  Part II outlines how these life cycle assessments 
nevertheless face numerous informational and related obstacles that 
impede their usefulness when they are produced by corporations.  
Part III then argues that sustainability life cycle analyses, at least 
at this early stage, are better viewed as public goods that should be 
conducted by a neutral third party and subsidized by the public, 
rather than treated as an extension of pollution disclosures that are 
the sole responsibility of the firm.  This public good characterization 
also manages to dodge the landmine of issues that ordinarily afflict 
the reliability of information provided by regulated parties with a 
stake in the outcome.  Part VI offers specific suggestions for how 
corporate sustainability assessments might be prepared by public 
experts and financed through a collective tax on corporations. 
I.  INFORMED SUSTAINABILITY 
There are multiple avenues for advancing corporate 
sustainability, but a key component to all of these methods is 
greater information about corporate practices.8  Individual corporate 
decisions about production processes, when amalgamated, yield a 
global market of goods and services which may be badly inefficient 
from an ecological point of view.  Yet, until the relevant information 
is gathered and synthesized, the overall impact of corporate 
practices and the areas for the most promising gains with regard to 
sustainability are obscured.9  As Professor Gaines notes, “shared 
information and mechanisms of social response to that information” 
are some of the primary keys to sustainable development.10  This 
 
 8. See, e.g., Judd Sneirson, The Sustainable Corporation and Shareholder 
Profits, 46 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 541, 556 (2011) (discussing Jensen’s theories 
and the critical role of information in sustainability); see also Beate Sjåfjell, 
Regulating Companies as if the World Matters, 47 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2012) (discussing the barriers to sustainability, which include 
accessing critical information). 
 9. For a superb discussion of the tyranny of small decisions in the 
environmental context, see William E. Odum, Environmental Degradation and 
the Tyranny of Small Decisions, 32 BIOSCIENCE 728 (1982), available at 
www.onlyoneplanet.com/Tyranny_of_small_decisions.doc. 
 10. Sanford Gaines, Reflexive Law as a Legal Paradigm for Sustainable 
Development, 10 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 1, 9 (2002).  Gaines goes further to suggest 
“the social functions of information disclosure and discourse between 
subsystems serve the core ideals of reflexive law because they enhance learning 
by all the participants and foster re-examination of (reflection on) attitudes and 
assumptions in all subsystems, not just the subsystem that generated the 
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Part outlines the critical role that information plays in making 
progress toward corporate sustainability. 
A. The State of Information on Corporate Sustainability 
Top commentators on corporate sustainability agree that 
information is not just an important ingredient, but it is also 
essential to establishing a meaningful sustainability program.11  At 
the most basic level, rigorous information on corporate 
sustainability informs the market—not simply downstream 
consumers, but also insurers, investors, corporate partners, and 
others who ultimately keep the corporation in business.12  Rigorous 
information on corporate sustainability informs internal practices as 
well: Enhanced corporate self-assessment is touted as one of the 
primary virtues of mandating information disclosures.13  Corporate 
sustainability information also identifies corporate practices that 
are most likely to benefit from greater regulatory oversight or 
market intervention.14 
 
information.”  Id. 
 11. See, e.g., id. at 21–22; see also John C. Dernbach, Navigating the U.S. 
Transition to Sustainability: Matching National Governance Challenges with 
Appropriate Legal Tools, 44 TULSA L. REV. 93, 113–14 (2008) (discussing the 
importance of information on sustainability, although focusing primarily on 
sustainability indicators as a way to provide information to multiple audiences 
and advance policy, market, and legal reforms simultaneously).  Arguably, this 
type of information may even be a prerequisite to some of the shifts in corporate 
thinking advocated by scholars like Professor David Millon.  See generally 
David Millon, Two Models of Corporate Social Responsibility, 46 WAKE FOREST 
L. REV. 521 (2011). Information is needed both to focus the corporation itself on 
possible gains as well as to empower external parties to pressure for change 
from without. 
 12. See, e.g., Bradley C. Karkkainen, Information as Environmental 
Regulation: TRI and Performance Benchmarking, Precursor to a New 
Paradigm?, 89 GEO. L.J. 257, 346 (2001) (discussing the range of stakeholders 
that will use information disclosures and exert pressure on corporations to do 
better); see generally Virginia Harper Ho, “Enlightened Shareholder Value”: 
Corporate Governance Beyond the Shareholder-Stakeholder Divide, 36 IOWA J. 
OF CORP. L. 59 (2010) (discussing the role of informed investors and 
shareholders in altering choices made by corporations); Grant M. Hayden & 
Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote and the False Promise of Shareholder 
Homogeneity, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 445 (2008) (discussing the possibility for 
corporate partnerships to encourage more sustainable practices by leveraging 
one corporation’s social responsibility to alter other corporations’ conduct). 
 13. See, e.g., William M. Sage, Regulating Through Information: Disclosure 
Laws and American Healthcare, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1701, 1778 (1999) (arguing 
that information disclosures can exert a powerful influence on internal decision 
making and can reveal valuable information that changes these internal 
decisions). 
 14. The TRI disclosures revealed very high levels of air toxic emissions, 
which in turn produced public pressure for greater regulation and led to much 
more stringent regulations in the 1990 Amendments to the Clean Air Act.  See, 
e.g., Sidney M. Wolf, Fear and Loathing About the Public Right to Know: The 
Surprising Success of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know 
W10_WAGNER 10/3/2011  6:04 PM 
2011] IMAGINING CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY 565 
Yet current regulatory programs provide only limited 
information on corporate sustainability.15  The Right-to-Know Act in 
the United States requires annual disclosures of corporate use and 
disposal of large amounts of hazardous substances.16  The resulting 
Toxic Release Inventory (“TRI”) disclosures provide useful 
information about corporate sustainability with regard to handling 
and disposal of hazardous substances, but these load estimates offer 
little insight into meaningful opportunities for a facility to reduce 
natural resource use, to minimize pollution, or to otherwise decrease 
a facility’s ecological footprint.17 
The Global Reporting Initiative (“GRI”), established by the 
United Nations Environment Programme (“UNEP”) and the 
Coalition for Environmentally Responsible Economies (“CERES”), 
provides a more robust measure of a corporation’s ecological 
footprint because it measures not only outputs, but natural resource 
use as well.18  The GRI offers external parties, like investors and 
 
Act, 11 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 217, 300 (1996). 
 15. See generally Jeff Civins & Mary Mendoza, Corporate Sustainability 
and Social Responsibility: A Legal Perspective, 71 TEX. B. J. 368 (2008) 
(discussing limited legal regulation to encourage sustainability). 
 16. Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 
11002–11003, 11022–11023 (2006) [hereinafter EPCRA] (requiring covered 
facilities to self-identify; to report their storage, use, and disposal of hazardous 
substances; and to prepare an emergency response plan). 
 17. Other regulatory requirements restrict the amount of pollution that a 
firm can discharge into air, water, or onto land.  See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 
U.S.C. § 1321(a)(2) (2006) [hereinafter CWA] (prohibiting the point source 
discharge of pollution without a permit that, in turn, is based on the capabilities 
of the best available technology); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 
U.S.C. § 6922 (2006) [hereinafter RCRA] (requiring generators to test their 
wastes to determine whether they are hazardous); id. §§ 6923–25 (2006) 
(requiring transporters and treatment, storage, and disposal units handling 
hazardous wastes to self-identify and follow regulatory requirements); Clean 
Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(i) (2006) [hereinafter CAA] (prohibiting the emissions 
of large amounts of air toxins without a permit specifying emissions limits for 
the source). These regulatory programs reduce the facility’s footprint, but they 
do not regulate the overarching consumption and output of a company.  Thus, if 
a company elects to use the dirtiest input and produce high quantities of waste 
for disposal, there are no regulatory impediments except for the costs of 
pollution control. 
 18. See GLOBAL REPORTING INITIATIVE, http://www.globalreporting.org 
/Home (last visited Aug. 30, 2011); see also David W. Case, Corporate 
Environmental Reporting as Informational Regulation: A Law and Economics 
Perspective, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 379, 395–401 (2005); GLOBAL REPORTING 
INITIATIVE, YEAR IN REVIEW 2008–2009, available at 
http://www.globalreporting.org/NR/rdonlyres/E8B6ED9E-1A29-4154-A6DA-F14
E6F71A2C9/3830/GRI_Year_In_Review_241209.pdf.  For sample reports, see 
DUKE ENERGY, ENVIRONMENTAL INDICATORS, available at  
http://www.duke-energy.com/sustainability/environmental-indicators.asp; THE 
COCA-COLA COMPANY, 2008/2009 SUSTAINABILITY REVIEW, available at 
http://www.thecoca-colacompany.com/citizenship/pdf/2008-2009_sustainability_
review.pdf.  See generally Williams, supra note 2, at 1640–61 (describing the 
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customers, an even stronger basis for evaluating a corporation’s 
commitment to and progress toward sustainability as compared 
with the TRI disclosures.19  GRI reporting is voluntary, however.  
Thus, while a number of Fortune 500 companies have conducted 
self-audits over the last fifteen years, participation in GRI still 
remains the exception rather than the rule.20 
GRI and TRI provide useful barometers to measure corporate 
sustainability, but because both are exclusively input and output 
focused, they miss opportunities to focus corporations on the ways 
that production operations can be altered to provide significant 
sustainability advances.21  GRI and TRI also allow firms to be self-
 
development of the GRI as well as other voluntary initiatives by corporations to 
minimize their environmental impacts). 
 19. See, e.g., Case, supra note 18, at 429–34 (describing these benefits). 
Other voluntary developments continue along this disclosure path, although 
they produced fewer success stories, at least in the literature.  The slowest 
progress may be occurring on the investment front; investors show interest in 
sustainability but appear, in the United States at least, to be making only 
limited accommodations for sustainability considerations in making important 
investment decisions.  See Alan Hecht, The Next Level of Environmental 
Protection: Business Strategies and Government Policies Converging on 
Sustainability, 8 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 19, 24 (2007) (describing the slow 
trends in the investment community to act on sustainability goals); see also 
Williams, supra note 2, at 1640–42 (providing a more optimistic picture of 
investor commitment to sustainability in some sectors, including banks and 
other finance organizations that follow the banking industry’s “Equator 
Principles” to encourage sustainable development in project finance); id. at 1645 
(describing the growth of socially responsible investors “whose information 
needs are broader than those of typical ‘financial’ investors”).  Some insurers 
have developed green insurance programs that offer reduced premiums to 
qualifying companies that are in turn based, at least in part, on a demonstrated 
commitment to sustainability.  See Domani and Garnet Offer ‘Sustainable’ 
Insurance Program, GREENBIZ (May 15, 2007), http://www.greenbiz.com/news 
/2007/05/14/domani-and-garnet-offer-sustainable-insurance-program.  There are 
even accounting requirements in the United States that require businesses to 
identify assets that may cause long-term damage and to identify how to reduce 
these risks.  See Hecht, supra. 
 20. By 2009, over one thousand companies had voluntarily conducted GRI 
reports.  See, e.g., Facts and Figures about GRI Reports, GLOBAL REPORTING 
INITIATIVE, http://www.globalreporting.org/AboutGRI/FactSheet.htm (last 
visited Aug. 30, 2011).  See also Williams, supra note 2, at 1640–41. 
 21. See, e.g., Raine Isaksson & Ulrich Steimle, What Does GRI-Reporting 
Tell Us About Corporate Sustainability?, 21 TQM J. 168 (2009), available at 
http://doc.isiri.org.ir/c/document_library/get_file?p_l_id=18924&folderId=20977
&name=DLFE-19078.pdf (examining the GRI reports of five cement plants and 
concluding that they do not provide this type of information about sustainability 
practices; specifically the reports do not allow for easy comparisons between 
firms nor in relation to the actual capabilities of the firm’s actual production 
process); Penny Sinclair & Julia Walton, Environmental Reporting within the 
Forest and Paper Industry, 12 BUS. STRATEGY ENV’T 326, 335, (2003) available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1002/bse.376/pdf (criticizing firms’ GRI 
reports for failing to provide the larger context within which they operate, 
which highlights the gains they are theoretically capable of making in 
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referencing in benchmarking their progress, a focus that neglects to 
reward ecologically-innovative business practices.22  Indeed, because 
both measures simply report on input and output over time, they are 
indifferent to the possibility that some types of processes or firms 
are unsustainable relative to competitors and need to be phased 
out.23  In addition, rather than keeping a firm focused on 
sustainability goals, a “good score” in the GRI risks becoming an end 
in itself which can distract firms from searching for design and other 
process innovations that may make more significant progress in the 
firm’s sustainability profile.24 
B. The Unparalleled Virtues of Life Cycle Analysis 
Although life cycle analysis is more information-intensive, it 
offers a substantially improved measure of corporate sustainability 
relative to the input and output measures embodied in the GRI and 
TRI reports.25  Life cycle analysis, which originated in industrial 
ecology, begins at the “cradle,” where raw materials are produced, 
and follows that production process through transport and 
manufacturing to the ultimate disposal, often by the consumer.26  
The goal of this analysis is to identify materials and burdens at each 
stage of the production process that are not recycled in a closed loop, 
paralleling natural processes.27  See Figure 1.  Such a holistic view 
of the process allows for a greater range of options for minimizing a 
facility’s ecological footprint, including redesigning the process 
entirely.28  By focusing on the design of production processes, rather 
 
advancing sustainability goals); Mark Stoughton & Elizabeth Levy, Voluntary 
Facility-Level Sustainability Performance Reporting: Current Status, 
Relationship to Organization-Level Reporting, and Principles for Progress, 21 
PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 265, 269 (2004) (identifying the lack of facility-based 
information and reporting as a major weakness in voluntary initiatives). 
 22. See, e.g., Milne et al., supra note 3, at 9 (raising this concern). 
 23. See, e.g., id. at 17–18. 
 24. See, e.g., id. at 11 (raising this concern). 
 25. See, e.g., D. ELCOCK, LIFE-CYCLE THINKING FOR THE OIL AND GAS 
EXPLORATION AND PRODUCTION INDUSTRY 72 (2007), available at 
http://www.evs.anl.gov/pub/dsp_detail.cfm?PubID=2154 (stating that 
“[s]ustainable development is the ultimate goal of the application of all life-cycle 
approaches”). 
 26. See, e.g., Robert J. Klee, Enabling Environmental Sustainability in the 
United States: The Case for a Comprehensive Material Flow Inventory, 23 STAN. 
ENVTL. L.J. 131, 143 (2004) (defining environmental sustainability in a 
narrower and more precise sense of carrying capacity based on materials flow, 
where the limits to the ecosystems’ ability to assimilate loading and material 
flows help identify the biggest burdens that threaten the limited carrying 
capacity). 
 27. See, e.g., id. at 145–46 (describing this cycling ideal for industrial 
processes as revealed through life cycle assessments and material flow 
analysis). 
 28. Facility-based assessments can also be tailored to individual plants 
and, thus, involve community groups and other stakeholders with a close 
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than simply the end-of-the-pipe or output adjustments, much 
greater environmental gains, as well as cost-savings, are possible.29 
FIGURE 1: EXAMPLE FLOW DIAGRAM OF A  






























Because the virtues of life cycle assessment (“LCA”) enjoy 
strong consensus among experts, the methods for conducting these 
assessments are becoming standardized by organizations such as 
 
relationship to the plant.  See generally Stoughton & Levy, supra note 21. 
 29. Nike, for example, redesigned shoes to reduce the use of glues or 
solvents.  See, e.g., DELOITTE, LIFECYCLE ASSESSMENT: WHERE IS IT ON YOUR 
SUSTAINABILITY AGENDA? 2 (2009), available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets 
/Dcom-UnitedStates/Local%20Assets/Documents/us_es_LifecycleAssessment 
.pdf. 
 30. SCIENTIFIC APPLICATIONS INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION, LIFE CYCLE 
ASSESSMENT: PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 15 (May 2006), [hereinafter SAIC], 
available at http://www.epa.gov/nrmrl/lcaccess/pdfs/600r06060.pdf. 
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the International Standards Organization (“ISO”).31  A typical life 
cycle assessment begins with a qualitative inventory of each stage of 
the process,32 which can provide useful information for decision 
making in and of itself.33  Most life cycle assessments are quite 
rigorous, however, and take the form of computational models that 
measure environmental burdens—often through a single unit—
which can then be used to identify the most promising areas for 
redesign or process adjustments.34 
To the extent that there is proof in the pudding, life cycle 
analyses boast of concrete victories.  A life cycle approach helped 
Tropicana learn that it was not the transportation of its juice, but 
the agricultural inputs that led to its larger-than-necessary carbon 
footprint.35  As a result, Tropicana focused its primary efforts on 
reducing fertilizer use rather than dedicating the same resources to 
increasing the energy efficiency of its vehicles.36  In a life cycle 
analysis of coal-fired power plants, Department of Energy (“DOE”) 
consultants compared cleaner coal-fired plants with older plants.37  
This analysis not only quantitatively identified the additional 
environmental burdens associated with the older plants, but 
pinpointed those costs to specific features within the life cycle.  This 
analysis also identified design changes that might improve the 
environmental performance of the older coal-fired systems.38 
From a regulatory standpoint, life cycle analysis can also 
 
 31. The ISO has developed standards for LCA. ISO, ENVIRONMENTAL 
MANAGEMENT: THE ISO 14000 FAMILY OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS (2009), 
available at http://www.iso.org/iso/theiso14000family_2009.pdf.  The Society of 
Environmental Toxicology and Chemistry (“SETAC”) and UNEP are exploring 
ways to utilize LCA more extensively in their programs and recommendations.  
See, e.g., UNEP/SETAC INTERNATIONAL LIFE CYCLE INITIATIVE PROCESS ON 
“GLOBAL GUIDANCE FOR LCA DATABASES,” available at http://www.estis.net/sites 
/lcinit/default.asp?site=lcinit&page_id=ABD68212-F8D8-48A6-83A0-9D82DE7E
D61A. 
 32. See supra Figure 1.  See also D. ELCOCK, supra note 25, at 3. 
 33. See D. ELCOCK, supra note 25, at 3; see also Walter Kloepffer, Life Cycle 
Sustainability Assessment of Products, 13 INT. J. LCA 89, 93 (2003) (observing 
that “the assessment methods used [for LCA] should be simple and not always 
quantitative”). 
 34. See, e.g., EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, LIFE CYCLE ASSESSMENT 
(LCA): A GUIDE TO APPROACHES, EXPERIENCES AND INFORMATION SOURCES 55 
(1998) available at http://www.greenbiz.com/sites/default/files/document 
/O16F34323.pdf (describing the importance of identifying a single functional 
unit that is used throughout the assessment). 
 35. DELOITTE, supra note 29. 
 36. Andrew Martin, How Green Is My Orange?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 21, 2009,  
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/22/business/worldbusiness/22iht-22pepsi.1958
3527.html. 
 37. See, e.g., PAMELA L. SPATH, MARGARET K. MANN, & DAWN R. KERR, LIFE 
CYCLE ASSESSMENT OF COAL-FIRED POWER PRODUCTION i–iv (June 1999), 
available at http://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy99osti/25119.pdf. 
 38. See id. at iv. 
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pinpoint occasions when adverse environmental impacts are simply 
shifted within a production process—for example, how end-of-the-
pipe controls may reduce one source of pollution only to move the 
problem elsewhere in the production process where it might be more 
difficult to address.39  A life cycle assessment of offshore drilling 
waste disposal, for example, revealed how strict prohibitions on the 
discharge of cuttings extracted with certain drilling fluids may have 
precluded opportunities to identify ways to convert the resulting 
hazardous waste (disposed in hazardous waste landfills) into a 
useful product.40  This internal recycling would have ultimately 
done much more to limit waste, production costs, and environmental 
risk than flat prohibitions on the generation of the waste.41 
Given the virtues of life cycle analysis, coupled with what has 
now become a relatively robust methodology for conducting the 
assessments, it is no wonder that many commentators are clamoring 
for greater use and incorporation of life cycle analysis into 
sustainability calculations.42  There has even been a movement to 
use life cycle analysis for a wide range of environmentally intensive 
practices, and not simply the design, packaging, or manufacture of 
products.43  Life cycle analysis is so highly regarded that its methods 
are also being expanded to encompass more than purely 
environmental concerns.44 
II.  IMPEDIMENTS TO CORPORATE SELF-ASSESSMENTS OF 
SUSTAINABILITY 
Just as life cycle assessments offer great potential for advancing 
corporation sustainability, the information-intensive quality of these 
assessments introduce some formidable challenges.  The most 
significant impediment, by far, is that a great deal of the 
 
 39. See, e.g., D. ELCOCK, supra note 25, at 37, 75. 
 40. See id. at 48–52. 
 41. See id. at 75, 49–52 (discussing a Paulsen study from 2003 that reaches 
this conclusion). 
 42. See, e.g., id. at 6 (touting benefits of life cycle analysis when conducted 
appropriately); SAIC, supra note 30; see also CELIA CAMPBELL-MOHN ET AL., 
SUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1367–71 (1993) (calling for more 
sustainability-based strategies in environmental law that consider production 
processes from resource extraction through consumption to disposal). 
 43. See, e.g., D. ELCOCK, supra note 25, at 44; Claire Early et al., Informing 
Packaging Design Decisions at Toyota Motor Sales Using Life Cycle Assessment 
and Costing, 13 J. OF INDUS. ECOLOGY 592, 594 (2009) (describing how forty 
percent of LCA are used to assess packaging processes). 
 44. Some analysts are attempting to sweep social and economic features of 
production into the methods and comparative assessments of sustainability. 
These features  have traditionally resisted a life cycle methodology.  See Evan 
Andrews et al., Life Cycle Attribute Assessment, 13 J. OF INDUS. ECOLOGY 565 
(2009) (developing LCA analysis to measure number of worker hours in a 
greenhouse tomato supply plant in order to identify some of the social costs of 
production); see also Kloepffer, supra note 33. 
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information needed to conduct facility-specific or even industry-wide 
life cycle assessments lies in the hands of the companies.  And, for a 
variety of reasons, these firms often lack the incentives to collect, 
analyze, or even share this basic information in a complete or 
comprehensive way.45  While some corporations may receive 
accolades for their forward-looking sustainability practices revealed 
in life cycle assessments, many more are likely to view these 
assessments as yet another opportunity for the public release of 
unflattering internal information about their environmental 
problems.  Much like environmental audits, and even basic TRI and 
GRI disclosures, corporations may be wary of conducting these 
assessments and, if they are required, may resist conducting them 
in a rigorous or comprehensive way.46  Indeed, the challenges 
associated with self-conducted life cycle analyses are more 
significant than TRI and GRI since the data collection and methods 
are difficult to prescribe in advance.  
This Part identifies several impediments to the production of 
reliable life cycle analyses when the analyses are conducted by 
corporations that have a stake in the outcome.  
A. Reliability of Data 
A life cycle assessment requires a great deal of data about a 
large range of inputs (including water usage and various chemicals) 
and outputs (including pollutant streams and discharges) at each 
stage of the production process, from natural resource extraction to 
disposal.47 Yet, since this data is largely in the hands of the 
corporation, it can be difficult to collect.48  A number of other 
environmental programs have relied, out of necessity, on 
corporations to produce much of the basic information about their 
compliance with laws and regulations,49 and in these cases the EPA 
has often found itself in a cat-and-mouse game with regulated 
parties in its effort to acquire reliable information.   
Over time, additional regulatory innovations have helped 
increase the reliability of some self-produced information from 
 
 45. See generally Wendy E. Wagner, Commons Ignorance: The Failure of 
Environmental Law to Produce Needed Information on Health and the 
Environment, 53 DUKE L.J. 1619 (2004) (making the argument that 
environmental law often ignores the asymmetrical quality of information that 
favors regulated parties). 
 46. See infra notes 55 and 62 and accompanying text. 
 47. See, e.g., D. ELCOCK, supra note 25, at 38 (discussing the challenges 
associated with data collection); EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, supra note 
34, at 59–60 (discussing the steps to data collection); SAIC, supra note 30, at 
22–45 (describing the steps involved in identifying useful data and developing a 
data collection plan). 
 48. See, e.g., Wagner, supra note 45 at 1632–59 (discussing, generally, the 
problems that have arisen in collecting information from regulated parties). 
 49. See, e.g., id. at 1663–70. 
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regulated parties.  For example, to gather accurate information 
about the pollutant emissions emanating from large utility stacks, 
Congress required that continuous monitors be installed on the 
stacks,50 and the EPA promulgated supplemental rules that 
penalize facilities when their continuous monitors break down.51  
The EPA has also experimented with the use of external auditors 
who, like financial auditors, inspect companies to assess their 
violations and help bring them into compliance.52   
Unfortunately, most of the tools developed to collect more 
reliable information from regulated parties are only useful in a 
narrow set of circumstances that do not extend to the data-intensive 
needs of sustainability life cycle assessments.  Expensive continuous 
monitors at the end of discharge pipes provide only a fraction of the 
internal data needed to produce a meaningful life cycle assessment.  
Deploying external auditors to oversee data production is both 
expensive and incomplete in providing a rigorous accounting of 
industrial practices over time.53  Some of the information on 
processes and inputs can even be trade secret protected and 
therefore disclosed to only a few agency officials.54  In fact, even GRI 
reporting, which is far more standardized because of GRI’s emphasis 
on input and output quantities and indicators, has encountered 
challenges in ensuring the reliability of the reported information.55 
 
 50. 42 U.S.C. § 7651k(a) (2006). 
 51. EPA Acid Rain Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 3590, (Jan. 11, 1993).  Congress 
initially required the EPA to issue rules that addressed monitoring 
breakdowns.  See 42 U.S.C. § 7651k(d) (2006). 
 52. See, e.g., Pork Producers Clean Water Act Compliance Incentive 
Program, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/oecaerth/incentives/programs/porkprodcip 
.html (last visited Aug. 30, 2011) (utilizing independent auditors to audit 
compliance problems for pork producers that signed a voluntary agreement to 
be audited and agreed to conduct needed remedial work in return for reduced 
penalties); see also Williams, supra note 2, at 1642 (describing the growth of 
this auditing and nonfinancial rating industry); see infra notes 66–68 and 
accompanying text. 
 53. There are internal checks that can be instituted on data collection to 
ensure the reliability of the data.  See, e.g., EUROPEAN ENVIRONMENT AGENCY, 
supra note 34, at 70–71.  To determine whether these steps have been followed 
faithfully, however, some type of peer review or oversight is still necessary. 
 54. Confidential business information (“CBI”) claims are regularly used to 
limit access to health information on toxic substances and pesticides, including 
information on exposure risks, and on chemical identity and ingredients.  
Confidential Business Information, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/pesticides/foia/cbi 
.htm (last visited Aug. 21, 2011).  Such claims may even be used to protect 
information collected by inspectors in the course of environmental compliance 
inspections.  See EPA Definitions, 40 C.F.R. § 2.201 (2003) (defining a business 
confidentiality claim). 
 55. GRI specifies a number of indicators and measures but some discretion 
is necessarily involved in application.  See, e.g., Case, supra note 18, at 435–46 
(discussing these features of GRI); see also UNEP/SUSTAINABILITY, RISK & 
OPPORTUNITY: BEST PRACTICE IN NON-FINANCIAL REPORTING 39 (2004) 
(identifying a lack of clarity in how the reporting principles work in practice). 
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As a result, there are substantial challenges in ensuring the 
reliability of corporate-conducted life cycle assessments.  Compared 
with GRI, life cycle assessments allow for even more error and bias 
in extracting basic internal data since there is much greater 
discretion for the corporation in identifying the types of data to 
collect, selecting the units of analysis (both in time and scale), and 
assembling the requisite information from company operations.56   
B. Disinterested Methods 
Beyond problems with ensuring the reliability of the input data, 
the methods for conducting a life cycle analysis also afford the 
analyst considerable discretion in how to conduct the assessment.  
This too presents problems when the company conducting the 
assessment has a stake in the outcome.57  For example, there are 
numerous discretionary points that arise in framing the scope of a 
life cycle assessment, developing the methods, and interpreting the 
data.58  When a company is conducting its own LCA, this remaining 
methodological discretion raises a risk that it might select the most 
beneficial assumptions in conducting its assessment and ignore 
others that might cast the company in a less positive light.  The 
resulting self-assessment could thus be prepared in ways that are 
afflicted with systemic biases that tilt in favor of the firm, but these 
biases will remain difficult to detect without careful review. 
The development of rigorous methods for other types of open-
ended assessments, like risk assessments, have posed similar 
challenges to environmental regulators.59  For example, there is 
evidence of sponsor-bias in manufacturers’ assessments of the 
 
 56. See, e.g., D. ELCOCK, supra note 25, at 12, 13, 39.  Elcock describes how 
life cycle analysis was manipulated initially, and this led to a lack of confidence 
in its approach.  He also notes how methods are becoming more standardized 
but identifies a number of ways that the standardization cannot eliminate all 
important areas of user discretion and remains rather “general”.  Id.  See also 
SAIC, supra note 30, at 6 (noting the judgment and multiple methods that are 
available to conduct LCA). 
 57. See supra note 56 (identifying the discretion involved in life cycle 
analysis methods); see also SAIC, supra note 30 (summarizing some of the 
discretion in conducing life cycle analysis). 
 58. See, e.g., SAIC, supra note 30.  By their very nature, life cycle analysis 
methods need to be flexible and adaptive, improving with experience and 
broader application.  A curse for devising a one-size fits all comprehensive 
model is the need for flexible assessments that are constantly changing, 
improving, and adapting to the needs of the locale (the stream), the operations 
(a particular type of plant), and the transit system.  Some of this can be built 
into computer methods, but a single model cannot identify all of these decision 
trees adequately.  See, e.g., D. ELCOCK, supra note 25, at 13, 39. 
 59. See, e.g., THOMAS O. MCGARITY & WENDY E. WAGNER, BENDING SCIENCE: 
HOW SPECIAL INTERESTS CORRUPT PUBLIC HEALTH RESEARCH 50–54 (2008) 
(discussing how there is room for manipulation in these types of assessments). 
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chronic hazards of their products and waste streams.60  In the 
biomedical literature, this systemic bias has been dubbed “the 
Funding Effect” since privately sponsored research is more likely to 
produce results favorable to the sponsor than research that is 
financed by disinterested parties, like the federal government.61  
Even more standardized sustainability disclosures, like GRI, have 
suffered from some of these challenges, since they too provide wiggle 
room for firms that prefer to highlight successes and downplay 
failures in applying the GRI indicators.62 
This discretion in methods has also been a continuing problem 
for life cycle assessments.  Relatively blatant evidence of self-serving 
biases in corporate life cycle self-assessments was discovered in the 
1990s which, in turn, sparked greater attention to the development 
of more rigorous methods for conducting these assessments.63  
UNEP, ISO and SETAC all worked to improve the methods for life 
cycle analyses in ways that guard against sponsor discretion to the 
extent possible.64  Nevertheless, the dynamic features of LCA make 
it difficult to develop a prescriptive method that guards against all 
forms of discretion.65  Methods that are too rigid run the risk of 
sacrificing innovation and creativity in the drive for reduced analyst 
discretion. 
Precisely for that reason, ISO attempts to increase reliability by 
encouraging the external peer review of a corporation’s life cycle 
assessment.66  Yet this external review is simply voluntary and, at 
least in 2005, there were indications that this review was not being 
used comprehensively or uniformly by corporations in their self-
 
 60. See, e.g., id. at Chapter 4 (providing numerous examples of how 
sponsors shaped research to suit their predetermined ends); see generally 
SHELDON KRIMSKY, SCIENCE IN THE PRIVATE INTEREST: HAS THE LURE OF PROFITS 
CORRUPTED BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH? (2003) (discussing this problem throughout 
the book with considerable support). 
 61. See, e.g., Justin E. Bekelman, Yan Li & Cary P. Gross, Scope and 
Impact of Financial Conflicts of Interest in Biomedical Research, 289 JAMA 454 
(2003) (conducting a meta-review of the literature and identifying a strong 
positive correlation between the outcome of research and the beneficial interests 
of the sponsor). 
 62. See, e.g., Milne et al., supra note 3, at 8 (summarizing the literature 
which suggests a “gap between the benchmarks provided by guidelines like the 
GRI and UNEP/SustainAbility and what companies actually report”) (emphasis 
in original); id. at 9 (noting the tendency of firms to “cherry pick” successes and 
ignore major social issues). 
 63. See, e.g., D. ELCOCK, supra note 25, at 12. 
 64. See, e.g., id. 
 65. See, e.g., id. at 13 (noting that because the ISO standard for LCA “must 
be applicable to many industrial and consumer sectors, it is rather general”); id. 
at 39 (elaborating on these issues). 
 66. See ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT, supra note 31.  See also SAIC, supra 
note 30, at 59–60 (describing the importance of a rigorous peer review process 
for life cycle analysis). 
W10_WAGNER 10/3/2011  6:04 PM 
2011] IMAGINING CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY 575 
assessments.67  For example, even when peer review is conducted, it 
may not be rigorous—either because the reviewers are biased 
themselves (and selected accordingly) or because reviewers face 
inadequate resources or incentives to engage in robust analyses of a 
firm’s LCA.68  Obviously, too, if there are not corresponding audits of 
the data-inputs, then shoring up the assessments may win the 
battle on methods but still lose the larger war on reliable 
assessments.   
When a company has considerable discretion to determine the 
methods for its life cycle self-assessment and when that assessment 
can affect the company negatively if it reveals unflattering 
information, then this discretion may translate into systemic, self-
serving biases that undermine the reliability of the assessment.69  
Unless regulators have substantial resources to scrutinize the 
models used for self-assessments, significant discretion in a 
company’s life cycle assessment will remain. 
C.  Comprehensibility 
A critical, third feature of a robust life cycle assessment is its 
comprehensibility to a wide range of users.70  Because multiple 
stakeholders will use the assessments, it is important that the 
assessments be understandable to those outside the life cycle 
assessment field.71 
 
 67. See, e.g., Joyce Smith Cooper & James A. Fava, Life-Cycle Assessment 
Practitioner Survey, 10 J. INDUS. ECOLOGY 12, 13 (2006) (noting that 45% of the 
respondents said they have conducted or contributed to LCA with no peer 
review; in response to another question, 38% had used internal company peer 
review, 33% had used one person external peer review, and 28% has used an 
external peer review panel). 
 68. Cf. DARYL E. CHUBIN & EDWARD J. HACKETT, PEERLESS SCIENCE: PEER 
REVIEW AND U.S. SCIENCE POLICY (1990) (identifying in detail the practical 
limitations of peer review in ensuring reliability and accuracy). 
 69. See, e.g., Thomas O. McGarity & Ruth Ruttenberg, Counting the Cost of 
Health, Safety, and Environmental Regulation, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1997, 2042 
(2002) (discussing the inflated estimates of the costs of compliance that are 
common in cost-benefit analyses and attributing some of this inflation to 
industry worst-case estimates); see generally MCGARITY & WAGNER, supra note 
59 (describing how a variety of sponsors, but particularly industries, “bend” 
science to predetermined ends to advance their interests). 
 70. See, e.g., HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF 
DECISION-MAKING PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS 242 (4th ed. 
1997) (criticizing organizations’ information systems as generally not being 
designed “to conserve the critical scarce resource—the attention of managers”). 
 71. See supra notes 12–14 and accompanying text (referencing this broader 
audience).  Even a simple pictorial of the life cycle costs of a production process 
can provide consumers with immediately accessible and valuable information 
that may alter their consumption patterns.  Investors, regulators, policymakers, 
and other more sophisticated audiences can digest well-drafted executive 
summaries, summary graphics, and tables in order to ascertain where the 
greatest insults to the environment lie within the larger network of production 
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When left to the discretion of an interested party who produces 
the report, however, the comprehensibility of life cycle assessments 
can be controlled or even manipulated.72  If a corporation conducts a 
life cycle analysis that reveals embarrassing information, for 
example, it enjoys considerable discretion to obscure the negative 
findings by writing the analysis in as technical a way as possible or 
obfuscating the most incriminating revelations.73 
GRI reporting would seem immune from this comprehensibility 
problem given its emphasis on comparable, input and output 
calculations in generic tables.  Yet even GRI reports can be 
“cluttered with information of little apparent use to readers, while 
missing out on the big picture risks and opportunities.”74 
Life cycle assessments magnify these comprehensibility 
challenges several-fold since the assessments are complex and give 
considerable discretion to the assessors to determine how the results 
ought to be communicated.  It is thus difficult, if not impossible, to 
prescribe the comprehensibility of a life cycle assessment in 
advance.  Even when results are communicated clearly, however, 
the comprehensibility of life cycle analysis may be impaired if the 
reports cannot be cross-compared among competitor firms.75  Yet in 
most cases, this cross-comparison will only occur when facilities use 
the same models for their assessments, which they may not be 
inclined to do without external pressure. 
III.  CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY AS A PUBLIC GOOD 
Extracting reliable life cycle analyses from corporations is 
fraught with difficulty,76 but one simple move can help avoid this 
impasse: sustainability analysis can be reconceived as a public good 
rather than a responsibility that should be shouldered by 
corporations.  Reconceptualizing life cycle assessments as public 
information helps sidestep the impediments to collecting reliable 
and comprehensible information identified in the prior section.  It 
also manages to produce considerably more relevant, accurate, and 
 
phases and processes and then they can begin to demand changes. 
 72. See, e.g., Stoughton & Levy, supra note 21, at 281 (noting the “entry 
barrier” to stakeholders that is often associated with sustainability reporting, 
particularly reporting at the facility level). 
 73. See, e.g., BRUCE M. OWEN & RONALD BRAEUTIGAM, THE REGULATION 
GAME: STRATEGIC USE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 4–5 (1978) (describing 
these and other types of information-based strategies for controlling the 
message). 
 74. See, e.g., UNEP/SustainAbility, supra note 55, at 34. 
 75. See, e.g., J. Emil Morhardt, Scoring Corporate Environmental Reports 
for Comprehensiveness: A Comparison of Three Systems, 27 ENVTL. MGMT. 881, 
891 (2001). 
 76. Cf. Gaines, supra note 10, at 21 (noting that “mechanisms for dealing 
with uncertainty, ambiguity, and inequity in the distribution of information are 
poorly developed in both theory and practice”). 
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hopefully path-breaking types of analyses and recommendations in 
forms that would not occur if individual firms, who have a clear 
stake in the findings, were the primary source of  this information. 
 Admittedly, a reconceptualization of sustainability assessments 
as public goods is at odds with conventional wisdom.  In most 
national and international circles, sustainability reporting is 
understood to be a natural extension of pollution reporting that 
discloses negative externalities and other bads that a corporation 
extracts from society.77  Yet this conception seems to be based more 
on analogies to TRI reporting and other corporate disclosures than 
on a thorough analysis of the unique features of sustainability 
assessments.  Such a close analysis reveals a number of ways that 
life cycle assessments fall closer to the public good side of 
environmental information than to regulating corporate bads. 
There are at least four features of industrial life cycle analyses 
that are more closely associated with public goods, at least at this 
early stage in improving corporate sustainability.  First, and 
perhaps most important, it is not clear what a life cycle analysis will 
reveal for any given industrial sector, and thus a life cycle analysis 
may not identify the excessive use of natural resources or polluting 
activities (i.e., negative externalities) in need of intervention.  For 
some manufacturing sectors it is possible that there are no 
environmentally smarter options available.  As such, life cycle 
analysis may often be informational and exploratory—identifying 
areas in need of innovation—rather than exposing corporate 
dereliction of core environmental responsibilities. 
Second, and along these same lines, conducting life cycle 
analyses and developing innovative solutions for more sustainable 
approaches in the future constitutes a type of intellectual property 
or public good for which a firm is unlikely to be able to capture its 
investment.78  Because the methods for LCA are constantly evolving, 
one corporation’s bright idea for how to conduct a life cycle analysis 
or capture sustainability gains through facility-based innovations 
may quickly become a good that its competitors can copy.  Without 
 
 77. TRI and GRI seem to be based on this model of placing responsibility on 
corporations to provide sustainability disclosures not only because firms possess 
superior control over much of this information, but because these inventories 
provide evidence of negative externalities and firms then must bear the primary 
responsibility for collating and producing this information.  See supra Part I.A. 
(discussing these programs).  Much of the scholarly commentary on 
sustainability disclosures seems to repeat this basic “social responsibility” basis 
for disclosure.  See, e.g., Case, supra note 20.  In earlier work, I also argue that 
these generic types of information disclosures are justified by the firms need to 
explicate the extent of their negative externalities.  See Wagner, supra note 45, 
at 1632. 
 78. See, e.g., Stoughton & Levy, supra note 21, at 280 (recognizing the 
proprietary information that might be revealed through facility level 
sustainability audits). 
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patents, copyrights, or other ways to convert these intellectual 
discoveries into property, sustainability innovations can be co-opted 
by competitors without compensating the originator of the idea.79  
Firms could even copy and embellish on another facility’s life cycle 
assessment and enjoy reputational gains without doing the initial 
work associated with conducting the basic assessment. 
Ironically, at the same time that first-mover firms who conduct 
LCAs and identify ways to improve the sustainability of their 
operations may be providing competitors with a ready template for 
copying their green advancements, they may also be providing a 
playbook for competitors to capitalize on their weaknesses.  If the 
life cycle analysis reveals inefficient or excessive waste in a 
manufacturing system, for example, then this internal self-
evaluation can be used against the company before it has had an 
opportunity to make improvements.  Ironically, some firms may 
contribute to their own demise by providing this type of admission 
against interest through voluntarily produced LCAs.80 
Third, just as the benefits of LCA are broadly dispersed toward 
public goods, the costs are concentrated on individual firms and can 
be quite high.81  Unlike other types of disclosures, like TRI or even 
Security Exchange Commission (“SEC”) disclosures, life cycle 
assessments can consume considerable resources.82  Data collection 
 
 79. In the past, the public good features of required information provisions 
in environmental law arose most pointedly with required testing of pesticide 
products.  Manufacturers proposing new pesticides were concerned that their 
tests would be used by other companies who did not have to pay to produce 
them.  See H.R. REP. NO. 92-511, at 1–2 (1971).  In response to this concern, 
Congress created a compensation program that allows companies to be 
compensated for the use of their test data by others.  See Federal Insecticide, 
Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. § 136a(c)(1)(F) (2006) 
(providing the original applicant a right to “exclusive data use” for registration 
of pesticides after 1978).  Analogously, the patent system protects drugs and 
other unique products from this theft of expensive public health assessment 
simply by providing a blanket product right to the product itself.  See Benjamin 
N. Roin, Pharmaceutical Innovation and Limits of the Patent System, PETRIE-
FLOM CENTER FOR HEALTH LAW AND POLICY, BIOTECHNOLOGY AND BIOETHICS, 
HARVARD LAW SCHOOL (Aug. 31, 2007), http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty 
/workshops/climenko/Roin.pdf. 
 80. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 2, at 1644 (discussing how the GRI 
reports set up “a dynamic where companies are potentially more susceptible to 
environmental or social political pressures” and thus may be worse off, in the 
end, by voluntary reporting). 
 81. See, e.g., Cooper & Fava, supra note 67 (listing as the three major 
barriers: “1. Time and resource requirements for the collection of data.  2. 
Complexity of the LCA method.  3. Lack of clarity as to the relevant benefits 
compared to the costs of conducting the LCA studies, including lack of apparent 
downstream interest or demand.”). 
 82. See, e.g., Early et al., supra note 43, at 595 (noting that “[a] 
comprehensive LCA can take months to prepare, costs thousands of dollars, and 
provides data on only one product rather than the suite of options that are of 
interest to decision makers”). 
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can be extremely costly83 and applying the models or methods of 
LCA requires expertise.84  From the firm’s perspective, then, 
conducting this detailed, introspective sustainability analysis is not 
a simple or inexpensive exercise.85   
Utilizing the outputs of LCA also requires an organizational 
structure that can act on the results, a feature that adds still more 
costs to the LCA process.  Some firms, and perhaps many, lack the 
internal management structures that allow for the internal cross-
fertilization that LCA demands.86  In one case study, for example, 
Toyota Motor Sales lacked the internal capacity to conduct the 
assessment and contracted with UCLA to develop a model for its 
system.87  Ultimately, Toyota enjoyed considerable environmental 
and cost savings by eliminating a particular packaging feature of its 
process;88 yet without this investment, the areas for improvement 
would not have been brought to light.89 
Last but not least, the large-scale costs associated with 
developing methods, models, and databases and viewing the 
problem more synoptically, rather than at an individual level, all 
favor a public good approach to life cycle analysis.  Publicly 
produced assessments can identify areas for cross-fertilization and 
better allow for the diffusion of information as compared with 
private assessments, which might not only lack this broader 
perspective, but might deliberately avoid sharing internal 
information since it could undermine a firm’s competitive edge. 
IV. REFORM 
Expert, neutral assessments of a manufacturing process are 
critical ingredients to a rigorous life cycle assessment and help pave 
the way to the development of sustainable innovations in processes, 
 
 83. In 2005, almost 70% of the survey participants identified this as the 
most costly feature of LCA.  See Cooper & Fava, supra note 67. 
 84. The development of off-the-shelf models has helped to keep these costs 
under some control, although expertise in applying the methods is still 
necessary.  See, e.g., id. at 13–14.  In a survey of LCA experts in 2005, only 20% 
percent listed the methodological applications as the most costly part of the 
exercise.  Id. at 13 (also noting that 15% listed application of the methods as the 
most time-consuming part of the process). 
 85. See, e.g., D. ELCOCK, supra note 25, at 5–6, 38 (noting the costs as a 
major barrier to LCA); Early et al., supra note 43, at 593 (noting the same). 
 86. For example, one firm may recognize the need for LCA of packaging 
systems that may present both environmental wastes and process inefficiencies, 
but they may lack the expertise and time to carry out such an assessment.  
Early et al., supra note 43, at 593. 
 87. Id. at 600. 
 88. See id. at 595 (reporting on other similar types of collaborations for 
conducting LCA, such as the collaboration between McDonald’s and 
Environmental Defense Fund on packaging). 
 89. See, e.g., id. at 604 (describing the environmental gains from changes in 
packaging). 
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technologies, and even product lines.  Yet it seems naïve to expect 
corporations will conduct these types of expensive analyses 
voluntarily, particularly when their own innovations can be easily 
co-opted by competitors.  Even if LCA was mandatory for 
corporations, the unavoidable discretion afforded to the analyst 
makes it difficult to ensure that the resulting assessments are 
reliable and comprehensible.  This final Part proposes that a public 
entity should conduct these assessments and describes how this 
might be done.  The Part closes by considering what the public good 
qualities of LCA suggest about other types of environmental 
information. 
A. Step 1: Public Life Cycle Assessments 
Since life cycle assessments come closer to being public goods 
than the straightforward disclosure of negative externalities, a 
disinterested public organization is the most appropriate entity to 
produce life cycle assessments.90  The resulting LCAs would be 
based on an average firm within a particular industrial sector, much 
as is currently done by the EPA in setting technology-based air and 
water pollution standards under the Clean Water and Clean Air 
Acts.91  If this generic assessment reveals reasonable areas for 
improvements, then consumers, investors, shareholders, and even 
regulators may begin to demand sustainability progress from firms.  
Individual facilities themselves will also learn of ways they can 
operate more sustainably, thanks to these public assessments. 
Under this public good view of sustainability assessments, life 
cycle assessments would be done by respected experts who are 
completely independent of the companies, but have access to 
internal corporate information.  Ideally, much of the analysis would 
be done cooperatively with firms since the goal is to identify areas 
for improvement and possibly cost savings.  To the extent that the 
life cycle analysts face opposition from some firms, information 
extraction tools—like EPA’s authority to request information under 
its various statutory mandates—would be needed to secure internal 
records or to ensure that the voluntarily provided records are 
complete.92  Indeed, because it has legal authority to access private 
 
 90. Cf. Stoughton & Levy, supra note 21, at 282–83 (emphasizing the need 
for facility-based reporting that derives “both from the intrinsic differences 
between facilities and the organizations of which they are a part and from the 
differences between organization and facility-level stakeholders”). 
 91. For the complete list of industrial sectors for which EPA developed air 
toxic emission standards under the Clean Air Act, see 40 C.F.R § 63 (2011). See 
also EPA, NATIONAL EMISSION STANDARDS FOR HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS 
(NESHAP), http://www.epa.gov/ttn/atw/mactfnlalph.html.  For the discharge 
standards promulgated by the EPA for industrial sectors under the Clean 
Water Act, see 40 C.F.R. §§ 400–471. 
 92. The EPA, for example, has extensively used its information collection 
power under Section 114 of the Clean Air Act to obtain internal, industry 
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records, the EPA is perhaps best situated to conduct these life cycle 
assessments,93 or it could subcontract the work to a respected 
nonprofit body like CERES.94 The resulting, industrial-sector life 
cycle assessments would ideally be peer reviewed and subjected to 
comments from the affected industry, although the expert assessor 
group would have complete independence in how to respond to 
comments.  Much like technology-based standards, the life cycle 
analyses would also be updated at regular intervals95 or could be 
subject to more informal updating processes (for example, the expert 
assessor could post a website that invited comments on revisions 
over time). 
In conducting the assessment, the expert assessor should 
produce two different, bookend life cycle analyses for each industrial 
sector: (1) a reasonable worst case life cycle assessment, and (2) the 
very best life cycle assessment for each industrial sector.  The 
reasonable worst-case analysis would present the assessment for a 
 
information about processes that inform its selection of best technologies under 
the Clean Air Act.  42 U.S.C. § 7414(a) (2006).  See, e.g., Wendy Wagner, 
Katherine Barnes & Lisa Peters, Rulemaking in the Shade: An Empirical Study 
of EPA’s Air Toxic Emission Standards, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 99, 125 (2011) 
(counting, on average, over eighty “formal” communications initiated through 
Section 114 between industry and the EPA per air toxic emission rule). 
 93. The EPA’s establishment of technology-based standards involved some 
of this internal process analysis, so the EPA is not new to this type of internal 
assessment.  See, e.g., D. Bruce La Pierre, Technology-Forcing and Federal 
Environmental Protection Statutes, 62 IOWA L. REV. 771, 810–11 (1977) 
(specifying three steps in setting technology-based standards: (1) categorizing 
industries; (2) identifying the contents of their respective wastewaters; and (3) 
identifying the range of control technologies available, all of which parallel the 
types of operational study that will be needed to conduct life cycle analysis).  
See also Sanford E. Gaines, Decisionmaking Procedures at the Environmental 
Protection Agency, 62 IOWA L. REV. 839, 853 (1977) (discussing the EPA’s study 
of the effectiveness of pollution control technologies under various plant ages, 
sizes, and manufacturing conditions in each industrial sector). 
 94. CERES consists of a mix of all affected stakeholders committed to 
advancing sustainability.  Specifically, “Ceres is a nonprofit organization that 
leads a national coalition of investors, environmental organizations and other 
public interest groups working with companies to address sustainability 
challenges such as global climate change and water scarcity.”  CERES, 
http://www.ceres.org/about-us/who-we-are (last visited Aug. 21, 2011). 
 95. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 7411(b)(1)(B) (2006) (giving the Clean Air Act 
revision expectations for new source performance standards) (“The 
Administrator shall, at least every 8 years, review and, if appropriate, revise 
such standards . . . .  [T]he Administrator need not review any such standard if 
the Administrator determines that such review is not appropriate in light of 
readily available information on the efficacy of such standard.”); 33 U.S.C. § 
1316(b)(1)(B) (2006) (giving the Clean Water Act expectations for revision of 
technology-based discharge standards and declaring that the EPA “shall, from 
time to time, as technology and alternatives change, revise such [new source 
performance] standards following the procedures required by this subsection”). 
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typical facility that falls in the bottom third relative to its 
competitors with respect to the sustainability of its operations.  The 
very best case analysis would be based on the sustainability profile 
of an imaginary facility that employs all of the best sustainable 
innovations and process inventions that are reasonably available.  
This best case sustainability profile serves not only to set a high bar, 
but to showcase the types of innovations that are possible.96 
Publicly-prepared life cycle assessments would operate much 
like penalty defaults: using the worst case assessment as a baseline, 
corporations would be able to distinguish their processes or boast of 
accomplishments that go well beyond the laggard facilities in their 
sector.97  The corporations can then use this positive comparison in 
the market to gain a competitive edge with insurers, investors, and 
the public at large.  Unlike a full-blown life cycle analysis, however, 
this distinguishing effort would limit the opportunities for 
worrisome discretion since the firm would be forced to compare 
specific industrial processes against a centralized, detailed model.  
Nevertheless, a process for validating a corporation’s claims in 
making these positive distinctions should also be established to 
provide added reliability to the firm’s efforts to compare its 
processes against the publicly produced sustainability assessments. 
Ultimately, a more reliable process for benchmarking and 
validating a corporation’s sustainability claims could go a long way 
towards improving available, environmental information in the 
current marketplace.98  One of the difficulties that front-mover firms 
currently face is the challenge of distinguishing themselves in the 
marketplace in ways that can be trusted by outsiders.99  As one 
leading sustainability consultant notes, “[i]ronically, green 
marketing has become one of the greatest threats to the success and 
scale of corporate sustainability practices.  Ubiquitous (and often 
unsubstantiated) green claims have created a green-washed, eco-
 
 96. Ideally, profiling the advances will also change the “strategic thinking 
of companies. . . . [by] demonstrat[ing] that the next level of environmental 
protection will arise not only from disincentives to pollute, but also from the 
positive vision of sustainability that is acceptable to business operation.”  
Hecht, supra note 19, at 24. 
 97. See generally Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete 
Contracts: An Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 91 (1989) 
(“[P]enalty defaults are purposefully set at what the parties would not want—in 
order to encourage the parties to reveal information to each other or to third 
parties.”). 
 98. See, e.g., Williams, supra note 2, at 1648 (describing the incentives of 
corporations to distinguish themselves in the market, beyond what the law 
requires, in order to enhance their reputation in the market and with 
investors). 
 99. See, e.g., Markus J. Milne et al., The Five Principles of Sustainable 
Branding, 3.ZERO (Sept. 25, 2008), http://3pointzero.org/blog/five-principles 
-sustainable-branding. 
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cluttered and eco-saturated marketplace.”100  The public 
assessments suggested here should help limit the ability of facilities 
to exaggerate or “green-wash,” since they offer specific baselines 
against which a firm’s boasting can be more readily compared. 
A central entity could also use these public life cycle 
assessments to identify innovations across multiple industrial 
sectors more generally,101 as well as gain a bird’s-eye view of 
American production processes.102  “Ecological rucksacks,” material 
flows, and other ecological accounting tools are also facilitated by 
life cycle analyses that are conducted by a central organization.  
These analyses can be used to provide a more systematic view of 
production and service processes that facilitate the redesign of 
larger systems as well as firms.103  The assessments are also likely 
to identify blind spots that are otherwise missed by regulatory 
approaches or voluntarily incentives.  For example, the assessments 
may highlight goods or services that are so costly to the 
environment that they should be significantly curtailed or even 
eliminated.  Finally, centralized LCA can help identify and compare 
national differences in the sustainability of industrial operations.  
One study compared United States and Canadian industries and 
identified differences in energy use, import and transit inputs, and 
other features that were specific to the company of origin that might 
otherwise be lost in an individualized LCA.104 
There are a variety of other, supplemental LCA tools that could 
be developed by a centralized expert analyst body to reduce the costs 
to firms of conducting their own facility-based assessments.105  For 
 
 100. See, e.g., id. 
 101. See, e.g., Milne et al., supra note 3, at 15 (describing a variety of tools 
that can link to LCA). 
 102. As the Department of Energy report notes: 
Results from existing LCA studies could be reviewed to identify 
common areas of concern, i.e., those processes or life-cycle stages that 
consistently produce higher impacts . . . .  For example, transportation 
emissions are major contributors to aquatic toxicity, acidification, and 
CO2 loading.  Thus, transportation may be an important consideration 
in decisions to build small process or disposal sites rather than 
centralized sites. 
D. ELCOCK, supra note 25, at 76. 
 103. See, e.g., id. at 17; Klee, supra note 26, at 172 (describing the 
advantages of a Material Flow Inventory, which could be based in part on the 
results of individual LCAs). 
 104. See, e.g., D. ELCOCK, supra note 25, at 40. 
 105. Databases that contain LCA software programs and even inventory 
data could be made available to firms in ways that enable more expansive and 
useful LCA to be prepared.  See, e.g., Cooper & Fava, supra note 67, at 14 
(calling for “greater development of and funding for life-cycle 
inventories . . . [and]  databases”).  These databases have already been initiated 
in other countries, therefore some of the preliminary work is already underway 
and the EPA may only need to follow the lead of these other countries in 
identifying the kinds of information that is useful and link that information to 
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example, a web-based model for a facility-specific LCA could be 
developed with user-friendly interfaces that allow corporations to 
insert a few parameters and then run the model.106  Commentators 
observe that “companies frequently look for simplified assessment 
tools that offer quick, approximate results,” such as checklists and 
simplified calculators, and this type of model could fill a needed 
niche.107  Guides and other learning materials, including workshops 
and symposia, might also be provided to help firms use the generic, 
industry-specific LCA for their facility as a springboard to improving 
sustainability processes.  The EPA has already made progress in 
preparing these types of guidelines,108 but further outreach and 
education is needed since “[m]any companies [in the United States] 
do not see how life-cycle thinking can be applied to their specific 
operations—or even the benefits of doing so.”109 
With strong public leadership, LCA models can also be 
improved and expanded.  Since there have been relatively few 
validation checks on LCA models to ensure that they are robust, a 
central body like EPA or CERES could develop ways to match LCA 
models against the outputs of real systems to enhance the validity of 
the models.110  This central organization could also expand the 
range of features included in life cycle analyses to encompass 
adverse social and ecological impacts.111  Finally, the EPA or CERES 
could develop ways to improve the comprehensibility of the results 
of LCA and related sustainability assessments.112 
 
other publicly available LCA databases that have already been created.  See, 
e.g., D. ELCOCK, supra note 25, at 38 (identifying Europe, Japan, and Korea as 
having developed publicly shared databases on specific parts of the life cycle, 
such as energy systems, transportation, waste management, and production of 
bulk materials).  The development of simplified LCA that reduce the costs and 
time and begin with EPA’s generic assessments could also greatly accelerate the 
use of LCA by individual firms.  See, e.g., Cooper & Fava, supra note 67, at 14 
(noting that “anything that can be done to simplify the conduct of an LCA and 
reduce the costs and time required to complete the study” will be useful). 
 106. See, e.g., Early et al., supra note 43, at 595. 
 107. Id. 
 108. See, e.g., SAIC, supra note 30.  See the EPA’s web site dedicated to 
providing guidance to those interested in LCA at http://www.epa.gov/ORD 
/NRMRL/lcaccess/index.html. 
 109. See, e.g., D. ELCOCK, supra note 25, at 41; Cooper & Fava, supra note 
67, at 14 (advocating for “an internal champion for the promotion of LCA within 
an organization, development and dissemination of the value that LCA 
provides”). 
 110. See, e.g., D. ELCOCK, supra note 25, at 39–40. 
 111. A number of efforts are afoot to expand and develop the social features 
of LCA.  See, e.g., id. at 73–74.  To the extent that the EPA becomes an 
important developer of the methods of LCA, it would seem to have valuable 
expertise to contribute to these efforts.  See, e.g., id. at 73 (recommending 
greater attention to developing these socially based assessments). 
 112. The results of LCA and related reports should be accessible to a wide 
range of stakeholders and, thus, the communication may need to be tiered in 
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B. Step 2: Regulatory Incentives to Do Better 
In order to produce meaningful incentives for firms to take 
sustainability seriously, the life cycle assessment could also be used 
as a baseline for imposing additional regulatory controls that 
encourage or even require specific sustainability improvements from 
corporations.  Firms might be “commanded” to reach certain 
sustainability goals in ways that parallel something like the 
technology-based standards of the Clean Water and Clean Air Acts.  
For example, all firms would be required to reach some mid- or best-
available level of sustainability within their industrial sector, likely 
required through legislation.  
Alternatively, all firms in a given industrial sector could be 
charged a sustainability tax based on the total resource use and 
waste production of the reasonable worst-case life cycle for their 
industrial sector (perhaps further adjusted by the size or production 
volume of the facility).  Facilities that provide validated accounts of 
how they accomplish sustainability gains above this baseline could 
then earn tax credits.  Companies that go further and actually 
pioneer innovations in sustainable technologies or operations might 
not only enjoy even greater tax credits, but also reputational 
benefits—for example, being officially certified by the EPA, or 
another nonprofit, as a corporate leader in sustainable innovation. 
Identifying meaningful distinctions between individual firms 
and the default worst-case sustainability life cycle will require a 
detailed review of a company’s submission and thus will necessitate 
the dedication of considerable agency resources.  One way to finance 
these important facility-specific evaluations is through the 
sustainability tax itself.  The sustainability tax would operate 
simultaneously as an incentive for companies to innovate or do 
better (hence lowering the tax) and as a mechanism to fund the 
ability of an external party, like the EPA, to certify differences 
between firms that warrant recognition. 
It is ultimately possible that some sustainable innovations will 
be valued as intellectual property due to the high research costs 
involved in developing the product.  At the same time, however, it is 
counterproductive to reward innovation in sustainable practices 
with patents that then allow firms to charge others a licensing fee in 
 
detail to reflect this diverse audience.  See, e.g., Stoughton & Levy, supra note 
21, at 280–81 (emphasizing the importance of comprehensibility in these 
reports).  At base, however, the reports should be clear and as simple as 
possible to maximize their value to these constituencies.  See, e.g., Raphael 
Bemporad & Mitch Baranowski, Branding for Sustainability, PACKAGE DESIGN 
MAG. (Dec. 2008), available at http://www.packagedesignmag.com/sites 
/packagedesignmag.com/files/BBMG_sustainability_white_paper.pdf (discussing 
the need to create “opportunities for multiple stakeholders to help shape, 
realize and share the benefits of products and services based on a seamlessly 
integrated business and sustainability strategy”). 
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order to become more sustainable themselves.113  Since innovations 
in sustainability should be shared with the larger community, 
barriers to the diffusion of sustainable innovation due to patents 
and other forms of corporate intellectual property need to be 
monitored closely.  Ultimately, more targeted subsidies may need to 
be developed to encourage still greater private innovation. 
C. Information as a Public Good 
Traditionally, information disclosures have been used to force 
firms to disclose their negative externalities; yet this narrow view of 
information disclosures may be foreclosing opportunities for 
advances in corporate sustainability.114  Indeed, a “public good” 
dimension to environmental information may be a perspective that 
has been lacking in the design of environmental programs more 
generally.  Professor Biber, for example, has argued that a rigorous 
ambient monitoring regime should not be established piecemeal, but 
instead benefits from a single, collective entity that oversees the 
data collection so that the data is reliable and amenable to cross-
comparisons across regions and over time.115  In drug regulation 
there in fact appears to be a shift occurring that depends more 
substantially on the Food and Drug Administration to collect and 
analyze all publicly available information, including adverse effects 
reports, and use that information to supplement the research 
submitted by drug manufacturers.116  Even historically, the first, 
often noncontroversial, step toward enacting pollution standards 
began with an agency like EPA that identifies what the better 
pollution control technologies could accomplish within various 
industrial sectors.117  In these programs, firms were expected to 
 
 113. See supra notes 79–80 and accompanying text. 
 114. Cf. Sulaiman A. Al-Tuwaijri, et al., The Relations Among 
Environmental Disclosure, Environmental Performance, and Economic 
Performance: A Simultaneous Equations Approach, 29 ACCT., ORGS. AND SOC’Y 
447, 469 (2004). 
 115. See, e.g., Eric Biber, The Problem of Environmental Monitoring, U. 
COLO. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3 
/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1680000. 
 116. See, e.g., Pasky Pascual, Liz Fisher & Wendy Wagner, FDA 
Modernization and the Revolutionization of Collective Science in Public Health 
Law (forthcoming) (on file with author); see generally Title IX of the Food and 
Drug Administration Amendments Act of 2007, Pub. L. No, 110-85, 121 Stat. 
823. 
 117. See, e.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(2)(C)–(D) (2006) (stating 
that the EPA is required to set technology-based standards for water toxins 
from point sources); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7412(b) (2006) (listing 189 air 
toxins for which technology-based standards must be promulgated).  This 
collective, public information baseline then serves as the benchmark against 
which firms are measured to ensure that they were doing their “best” or, more 
accurately, doing their legally required reductions in pollution control.  See 
Julie Thrower, Adaptive Management and NEPA: How a Nonequilibrium View 
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meet publicly established targets but were not required to conduct 
their own research and development to discover what these targets 
should be.118  
Figure 2 provides a re-conceptualization of different types of 
information-based disclosures according to their public good 
qualities.  Sustainability life cycle analyses for industrial sectors, at 
least initially, fall closer to the public good axis because they have 
only a limited assurance of highlighting negative externalities and a 
much greater probability of introducing information on sustainable 
innovation that will benefit other firms.  Other types of 
environmental programs might similarly benefit from attention to 
the fundamental public good qualities of the underlying information.  
For example, the creation of environmentally superior substitutes, 
such as green chemistry, is not currently encouraged through 
regulatory processes even though the development of these 
innovations primarily benefits the general public.119  Even some of 
the green chemistry inventions that receive presidential awards are 
patented and presumably must be purchased through licenses, thus 
impeding companies from adopting the inventions.120  Identifying 
the public goods qualities of this environmental information helps 
focus analysts on the need to subsidize certain research and 
development while at the same time ensuring the rapid and low-cost 







of Ecosystems Mandates Flexible Regulation, 33 ECOLOGY L. Q. 871, 879 (2006). 
 118. See 33 U.S.C. § 1311(m)(1)(G) (2006) (stating that research and 
development of water pollution control technology is only required if an 
applicant is permitted to abide by differing standards than those listed in the 
rest of the section for industrial discharges into deep seas).  Research and 
development is not mentioned anywhere else in the Clean Water Act. 
 119. Because of its public good character, the EPA has a team of researchers 
that are dedicated to green chemistry innovation.  See Green Chemistry and 
Engineering, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/nrmrl/std/cppb/greenchem.  The EPA 
also has a grant program that funds green chemistry innovation.  See Grants 
and Fellowships, EPA, http://www.epa.gov/gcc/pubs/grants.html.  But the EPA 
does not actively encourage green chemistry through its regulation of private 
activity (nor is this contemplated in the authorizing legislation passed by 
Congress). 
 120. The EPA has an annual Presidential Green Chemistry Challenge 
Award that is given to several recipients and is awarded by the President.  Both 
universities and industry members are eligible to enter.  While there is an 
emphasis on broad applicability in terms of both transferability to other sectors 
and economic feasibility, most of the entries have already been patented, 
trademarked, and commercialized by the time they are entered.  See 
Presidential Green Chemistry Challenge, EPA, http://www.epa.gov 
/greenchemistry/pubs/pgcc/presgcc.html. 
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This analysis of the public good features of sustainability may 
only be a start in identifying ways in which reframing some 
intractable information problems as public goods begins to break up 
the information logjam that has stalled progress in environmental 
law.121  Developing a strong base of public information builds on the 
expert capabilities of the administrative state and approaches 
particularly intractable information-based challenges in a more 
collaborative way.  Once information is developed on these 
environmental practices, complementary political, economic, and 
related market forces can use the information as a springboard to 
encourage greater sustainability and related gains in the future. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States still “does not have a sustainability 
strategy.”122  The most promising proposals in the current 
economically and politically fragile climate are those that can be 
accomplished without political warfare and that build on progress in 
incremental ways.123  The proposal here—to assign to regulators or 
 
 121. Cf. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling 
Information Deficits in Environmental Regulation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1409, 1410 
(2008) (stating that environmental assessments have not led to any significant 
impact). 
 122. Hecht, supra note 19, at 23. 
 123. See, e.g., UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, 
GLOBALIZATION: NUMEROUS FEDERAL ACTIVITIES COMPLEMENT U.S. BUSINESS’S 
GLOBAL CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY EFFORTS 15 (2005). 
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neutral third-party institutions the task of developing facility-
specific life cycle analyses—seems to be a modest first step in this 
long march towards corporate sustainability.  This information-
generation approach also develops a partnership with business that 
is in line with larger goals for enhancing corporate social 
responsibility in ways that go beyond what specific legal 
requirements can accomplish standing alone.124 
While the proposal advanced here will by no means produce 
perfect information, by trading off detail and specificity in individual 
firm LCAs on the one hand for comprehensiveness and more general 
illumination of the sustainability of diverse processes and practices 
through industry-wide LCAs on the other, progress can be made on 
the sustainability front more quickly.125  By producing large 
amounts of fresh and relevant information about corporate 
sustainability, consumers, investors, and other actors will be better 
able to compare and evaluate the sustainability of corporations and, 
if necessary, demand change. 
 
 124. The GAO report on corporate responsibility identified four ways to 
enhance corporate social responsibility: (1) endorsing or rewarding good 
behavior, (2) facilitating improvements through outreach and education, (3) 
partnering with voluntary and collaborative partnerships, and (4) mandating 
through the law.  See id. at 23–25. 
 125. Cf. Gaines, supra note 10, at 21 (noting the need to accept imperfections 
in information collection almost as a prerequisite to developing robust 
information disclosure strategies). 
